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O RO C C O’S T R A N S I T I O N TOWA R D D E M O C R AC Y h a s
not been smooth. The late King Hassan II initiated a
p rocess of political liberalization in the late 1990s and
his son, King Mohamed VI, continued this legacy.
O ver a few short years, the country saw the release of hundreds of polit-
ical prisoners, a substantial reduction in the frequency of tort u re and
f o rced disappearances, and increased public exposure of past atro c i t i e s
committed by state security forces. A major innovation was the
September 2002 parliamentary elections, which we re the first transpar-
ent and re l a t i vely free elections in the history of post-independence
Mo ro c c o. Even the press, a traditionally re p ressed sector, experienced a
gradual but steady turn tow a rds increased freedom. Re g re t t a b l y, howe ve r,
Mo rocco seems to take two steps backward for each step taken forw a rd .
The May 16, 2003 terrorist bombings in Casablanca instantly
changed the landscape of democratic consolidation in Mo ro c c o. Wi t h i n
a week of the bombings, the Mo roccan Parliament passed a new anti-ter-
rorist legislation to confront the perc e i ved national security threat. T h i s
legislation circ u m vents the democratic gains of the past years and endan-
gers Mo ro c c o’s growing civil society. One of the democratic gains dire c t-
ly affected by the passage of the anti-terrorist legislation is the new Pe n a l
Pro c e d u re Code, passed into law during a two year process of legislative
reform with wide participation and extensive debate. The tension
b e t ween these two pieces of legislation, both in their creation and
e n f o rcement, exemplifies the problem of democratic consolidation in
Mo ro c c o.
ONE STEP FORWARD: DRAFTING THE PENAL PROCEDURE
CODE
FOR YEARS, MOROCCAN HUMAN RIGHTS GROUPS and legal pro f e s-
sionals expressed deep concern about the existing Penal Pro c e d u re Code
and the lack of protection it provided. Mo rocco made minor adjustments
to the code throughout the years, but many of these laws have been left
untouched for more than two decades. Previous reforms we re only
responses to political upheaval, such as the attempted coup d’états in the
1970s, and did not create, on any substantial level, a real climate of fre e-
dom. Each reform relied on the monarc h y’s modus operandi of failing to
define a penal system for the country. Because the monarchy never cre-
ated or enforced a standard rule of law, the Mo roccan people feared the
u n k n own consequences of their actions.
The government initiated a concrete move to reform the Pe n a l
Pro c e d u re Code during an October 2001 assessment. Human rights
g roups, howe ve r, feared that the draft Penal Pro c e d u re Code (draft code)
under consideration failed to comply with international standards. T h e
political environment at the time offered a unique opportunity to include
input and analysis from a wide range of groups and experts on the pro-
posed reforms. A collaborative effort between the Mo roccan Ba r
Association and the American Bar Association (ABA) resulted in five
roundtable discussions about the draft code in various Mo roccan cities. 
The ABA facilitated the participation of a comparative criminal
p ro c e d u re expert and three international human rights law experts. T h e
e x p e rts provided commentary on the draft code and worked closely with
Mo roccan civil society to reform its provisions and recommend changes
to make it compatible with international legal principles. The five ro u n d-
tables we re attended by re p re s e n t a t i ves of the Prime Mi n i s t e r’s Office, the
Human Rights Consultative Council, the Commission for Legislation
and Justice in the Parliament, the Mo roccan Human Rights Or g a n i z a t i o n ,
the Human Rights League, the Mo roccan Prison Ob s e rva t o ry, the
Mo roccan Fo rum for Truth and Justice, the Mo roccan Association for
Judicial Independence, and the two chambers of the Parliament, as we l l
as scholars and academics from a variety of law faculties.
The roundtables provided a forum for the participants to sit dow n
and work together. Fo l l owing the roundtables, a re p o rt was submitted to
l e g i s l a t i ve committees in the Parliament, outlining the part i c i p a n t s’ re c-
ommendations for amending the draft code.  
PROBLEMS WITH THE DRAFT CODE
Next to the Mo roccan Constitution, the Penal Pro c e d u re Code is
the most important instrument used to define basic freedoms for the
o rd i n a ry citizen. Penal pro c e d u re draws the line between personal fre e-
dom and government intrusion. “One can easily compare the penal pro-
c e d u re code,” quipped an expert, “to a seismograph that registers not
only earthquakes shaking eve rything up, but also registers the slightest
m ovements in the earth as with the code in society.” Enacting a new
penal pro c e d u re code was there f o re an extremely sensitive undert a k i n g .
One of the most controversial aspects of the draft code was Art i c l e
283, which stated that “[n]o person will have the right to cite witnesses
in order to provide evidence that is in addition or contradictory to the
contents of the re p o rts or re c o rds drawn up by officials or assistants,
whose investigations are reliable under the law, either by challenging
them, alleging falsehood, or by their annulment as a result of some
b reach in that re s p e c t . ”
A rticle 283 would place exc e s s i ve power in the hands of the p o l i c e
j u d i c i a i re , which consists of members of the police and the gendarmerie.
It would establish that a confession contained in the re p o rt of the police
was final pro o f. No witness could be called and no other evidence intro-
duced to challenge a confession contained in a police re p o rt. Although
this would make for an expedited and inexpensive judicial pro c e e d i n g ,
A rticle 283 would problematically allow the police judiciaire to pre s e n t
the court with a confession that could not be legally challenged.
The draft code was modeled after the French Code of Cr i m i n a l
Pro c e d u re (French code). The French code, howe ve r, does allow criminal
defendants to challenge confessions in police re p o rts. The provisions of
A rticle 283 bore a greater resemblance to Napoleonic era code of crimi-
nal pro c e d u re, or code d’ i n s t ruction criminelle, enacted in 1809. Art i c l e
2 8 3 ’s provision giving exc e s s i ve power to the police judiciaire reflects the
antiquated mode of penal pro c e d u re in place today and is symptomatic
of a general lack of modernization in Mo roccan penal law.
A second problem posed by Article 283 was its restriction of the
j u d g e’s role in penal proceedings. The article instructs the judge to read a
confession in the accused’s statement to the police judiciaire as final pro o f
of guilt, in a process known as the p rocès ve r b a l. St ru c t u red as such, it
would not have allowed the judge to determine whether the accused had
actually committed the alleged offense or whether the confession was
obtained under duress or through tort u re. One expert explained that this
p rovision would, in effect, reduce the function of the judge “to that of a
n o t a i re , a notary public, who has the parties in front of him just to make
s u re that eve rything is all right and then signs a p rocès verbal that has been
p re p a red by the police judiciaire.” Article 283 would shift the judge’s ro l e
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of fact-finder to the police officer, improperly giving the latter the powe r
to decide cases.
A rticle 283 was not the only problematic article in the pro p o s e d
code reforms. Other problematic articles included Article 21(4), which
stipulated that a police judiciaire officer “may seek the help of an inter-
p reter if the person being interv i ewed speaks a language or dialect in
which the police judiciaire officer is not pro f i c i e n t”; Article 5, which con-
firmed a statute of limitations for a wide range of crimes, including
crimes against humanity; and Articles 66 and 80, which would allow
s p e c u l a t i ve custody for up to 192 hours without an explicit guarantee of
the right to counsel, notification of family members, or freedom fro m
physical violence.
While the draft code posed numerous advances compared to its
p re d e c e s s o r, it still contained controversial provisions that posed a sero u s
t h reat to Mo ro c c o’s efforts to establish a law-abiding society. Fo rt u n a t e l y,
the roundtable participants we re given broad discretion in deve l o p i n g
their critique of the draft code.
INTERNATIONAL LAW ANALYSIS OF THE DRAFT CODE
Mo rocco signed and ratified the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights (ICCPR) in the late 1970s, and in doing so explicit-
ly pledged to adapt its laws to international principles. The part i c i p a n t s
a n a l y zed the draft code thro u g h
the lens of Articles 2, 4, 7, 9, and
14 of the ICCPR, as well as the
C o n vention against To rt u re and
other forms of Cruel, In h u m a n ,
or Degrading Treatment or
P u n i s h m e n t ( To r t u r e
C o n vention) and the Ba s i c
Principles for the Treatment of
Pr i s o n e r s .
In developing their re c o m-
mendations, the part i c i p a n t s
a rticulated some guiding princi-
ples. First, the aim of amending
the Penal Pro c e d u re Code is to
enhance the credibility of the
law and raise citize n s’ aware n e s s
of its limits and enforc e m e n t
p owers. Second, Mo rocco has
an obligation to incorporate
into its Penal Pro c e d u re Code
rights that are guaranteed under
international human rights
i n s t ruments. Fi n a l l y, the law has supremacy over those who formulate
and enforce it.
The participants noted in all the roundtables that Article 283 was
inconsistent with Mo ro c c o’s international commitments mentioned
a b ove. First, the article did not guarantee objectivity in the inve s t i g a t i ve
and inquiry processes. Second, it encouraged police judiciaire officials and
assistants to use violence to extract confessions. T h i rd, it precluded the
judge from conducting investigations, effectively transferring trials fro m
c o u rts to police stations. Fi n a l l y, it violated the right of the accused to a
p resumption of innocence.
With respect to Article 21(4), the participants unanimously found
that placing the decision to provide an interpreter during interro g a t i o n
within the discretion of the police judiciaire was inconsistent with Art i c l e
14, paragraph 3(f ) of the ICCPR. The participants re c o m m e n d e d
amending this section so that police judiciaire officers would be re q u i re d
to use a language understood by the person or provide an interpreter dur-
ing interro g a t i o n .
Ad d i t i o n a l l y, the participants found that Article 5, which placed a
statute of limitations on crimes against humanity, conflicted with
Mo ro c c o’s obligations under the ICCPR. They recommended amending
this article to provide that public proceedings would not lapse under any
statute of limitations for alleged crimes against humanity.
The participants similarly found inconsistencies in Articles 66 and
80 with respect to Mo ro c c o’s international obligations, part i c u l a r l y
re g a rding periods of speculative custody and protection of the accused
during interrogation. Based on the accepted interpretation of Article 9,
paragraph 3 of the ICCPR, the participants agreed that an unjustified
detention for periods upw a rds of 190 hours did not constitute “t r i a l
within a reasonable time.” They recommended amending the periods
p rescribed in Articles 66 and 80 to not more than the day follow i n g
detention. The participants further recommended the notification of the
a c c u s e d’s family members, as well as notifying the accused of his or her
right to have a lawyer pre s e n t .
Ul t i m a t e l y, the Parliament approved seve n t y - f i ve percent of the
p a rt i c i p a n t s’ recommendations, including the elimination of draft Art i c l e
283 in its entirety and the establishment of mechanisms to pre vent tor-
t u re during detention. The approval of these changes was a testament to
the democratic inroads Mo roccan society had achieved. Un f o rt u n a t e l y,
the fragile nature of that democracy soon became appare n t .
TWO STEPS BACK: THE 2003 ANTI-TERRORISM LAW
On May 16, five bombs exploded in the heart of Casablanca and left 32
dead and over 100 wounded. This terrorist action opened the gate for a
s t rong re v i val of security force measures and draconian penal law. Si n c e
the bombings in Casablanca, human rights pro g ress has rapidly declined
in Mo ro c c o. Within months, the positive steps evidenced by the re f o r m
p rocess of the Penal Pro c e d u re Code we re almost completely rolled back.
Allegations of arbitrary arrests, tort u re, and extra-judicial killing are
becoming rampant. Many fear that the hard gains made to move the
c o u n t ry tow a rd democracy might be in jeopard y.
A week after the bombings, the Mo roccan Parliament approved an
a n t i - t e r rorism law, which concerned legislators and human rights
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activists had managed to block in the past. 
The anti-terrorism law added a controversial new definition of ter-
rorism to the Penal Code. A terrorist act is no longer the only cause for
p rosecution: merely commenting on the act, even by newspapers or other
media, can now be considered a crime. Since the passage of the law, many
journalists have been arrested under this provision and are in the pro c e s s
of being sentenced. The law re i n t roduced provisions re g a rding incom-
municado detention, which we re amended in the Penal Pro c e d u re Code.
It also increased the number of days that a person could be held without
charge or access to counsel. The law increases the risk that an accused in
custody will be subject to tort u re. In addition, provisions in the law allow
p rosecutors unilaterally to order wiretaps without first seeking authoriza-
tion from a judge or other monitoring body.  
While a state may be justified in taking drastic measures to pro t e c t
its citizens in a time of crisis, Mo rocco did not announce a state of emer-
gency before the parliament passed the Mo rocco anti-terrorism law.
Because it is in effect without a definite term, the anti-terrorism law can
squelch democratic debate and freedom of the press during internal
u n rest as well as during peace. In addition, all people accused of criminal
a c t i v i t y, whether terro r - related or otherwise, are subject to decreased pro-
cedural safeguards.  
CONCLUSION
EVEN BEFORE THE TERRORISM BOMBINGS of May 16th, the pro c e s s
of political liberalization was tainted with re p ression. The Mo roccan gov-
ernment continued to crack down intermittently on human rights
defenders and journalists, at times violently dispersing demonstrations
and suppressing critical publications. Cu r re n t l y, state security forc e s
re p o rtedly continue engaging in tort u re and arbitrary detention with
i m p u n i t y. Prisons are seve rely ove rc rowded and substandard conditions
persist. In addition, the Mo roccan government has not yet provided sat-
i s f a c t o ry answers about hundreds of disappearances that occurred prior
to the initiation of the reform process. 
Processes such as the formal debate around the draft code, howe v-
e r, gave hope of a brighter future for Mo roccan democracy. Re g re t t a b l y,
the hope for democratic Mo rocco has been placed in a more pre c a r i o u s
position with the gove r n m e n t’s precipitated and authoritarian re s p o n s e
to the terrorist attacks of May 16. Now, the ve ry integrity of Mo ro c c o’s
p rocess of democratic consolidation is being challenged. The true test for
the authorities in Mo rocco is how to deal with this new threat to securi-
ty while still promoting the path to democracy, trust in civic institutions,
and the supremacy of the law.  H R B
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